Syria Today | The Ba'ath in Another Time

The current crisis signals the end of an era of over five decades of the Ba'ath as a ruling party, and at the same time is the end of the 1963 coup.

By Nabil al-Samman
Photo Adel Samara

The opposition's accusations about the corruption of the regime and the homogeny of the Ba'ath Party are not important here.

The coup nationalised small private establishments which cannot be compared with the new monopolistic economy, and put into effect an emergency law which was in power for over forty years. The Ba'ath Party's justification of those measures was defending itself from the political enemies of the revolution, with the additional excuse of the external threat posed by Israel.

A constitution safeguarding individual rights was annulled and access to information has been controlled by the Ministry of Information, with the government and the party controlling the three daily newspapers which reflect the stance of the Ba'ath Party. Moreover, political parties were suspended and politicians denied civil rights.

The Ba'ath coup intended to bring about fundamental changes in political, social and economic arenas, but it failed at all levels. It disintegrated the structure of Syrian society without establishing a new order. The Ba'ath Party depends on the revolution to build its legitimacy.

The contradiction between what the ruling party preaches and what it does have become glaring. "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism" is the Ba'ath's principle slogan; however, it has changed over time, due to the claim of pragmatism. The motto "what is taken by force must be regained by force" has been replaced by the recognition of the state of Palestine according to the 1967 borders.

The salient characteristics of Syrian life are the antithesis of these great slogans. Power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of a few and those of their trusted supporters. Freedom of expression is non-existent. Huge corruption far outweighs socialism.

Continuous squabbles among the Ba'ath Party's factions took place. The efforts of the Syrian Ba'ath party to end the long-lasting quarrel with the Iraqi Ba'ath branch were rebuffed. The two countries were on the verge of a war. Recently the Syrian government has cooperated with the Iraqi one, which banned the Iraqi Ba'ath party.

Also, a massive change took place with the Syrian armed forces. Ideological and factional disputes, as well as an untrained army, caused the defeat in the 1967 war and later also the failure of the Syrian–Israeli negations. The party filled the army with its supporters, and connections outweighed ideological concerns. Today's Ba'ath turned into a clan masquerading as a political party. It is more or less a collection of bourgeois, feudal, and tribal opportunists and sectarian realities.

The illusory socialism was replaced by a so-called social market economy, a form of monopolistic capitalism. The new wealthy class amassed billions of dollars under shadowy illegal circumstances, but the Syrian government is not willing to substantiate or correct it. There is an evident and unequal division of income and wealth between the super-rich "velvet generation", the offspring of top officials and the business class, on the one hand, and the poor class on the other. The Ba'ath has nothing to offer to their average supporters beyond the opportunity to advance themselves and make money.

The Ba'ath seems to rely exclusively on the option of repression, probably reckoning that it can buy time with considerable assistance from security. In the long run, however, the brutality of the security forces risks inspiring more opposition that it crushes, especially if it is unaccompanied by reform. The ceaseless violence has produced an atmosphere of crisis and repression – fertile ground for spreading opposition from a few bands of anti-regime figures to a wider base of the Syrian people. While blaming the domestic uprising on international conspirators, the regime has rapidly expanded the internal intelligence agency. As a result, there are more men carrying Kalashnikov assault rifles on the streets of Homs. They wear no uniforms, but the respective divisions of the security forces can distinguished by the type of clothes they wear or the colour and model of four-wheel-drive vehicles they drive.

This state of affairs is not surprising given the severe constraints on political dialogue, and unwillingness to tolerate political reform.

Nabil al-Samman is a professor of engineering economics and a political and economic analyst.