Syria Today | Weighing up the Consequences

Weighing up the Consequences

By Marwan Kabalan
Photo Adel Samara

Syria surprised many when it declined the EU’s invitation to send its foreign minister to Luxemburg to sign the long-delayed EU-Syria Association Agreement last October. Visibly irked that it had not been consulted prior to the EU announcement, the Syrian government said it needed more time to study the document.

Having pushed so hard for the Association Agreement to be signed over the past five years, Syria’s sudden change of tone has left many Europeans perplexed. Yet while most European diplomats in Damascus would admit the invitation was extended in an improper manner, it is unlikely that this is what prompted the country to baulk at signing the agreement. The terms of the deal have not suddenly changed, so why is Syria now dragging its heels?

First and foremost, the prism through which Syria views the benefits of the EU Association Agreement has changed.

With Syria’s gradual return to the international stage and the thaw in Syrian-US relations since US President Barack Obama took office the political gains of the agreement have become less expedient. This, coupled with the country’s rapid transition from a state-controlled economy to a social market model in recent years, has put the economic conditions of the Association Agreement into the spotlight.

The local economy has been hard hit in recent years following Syria’s signing of a number of free-trade deals in the region and its exposure to the Chinese export market. Local manufacturers complain that they cannot compete with better – and cheaper – quality goods now flooding the market from China, Turkey and the Gulf. Many believe that signing the Association Agreement and the greater exposure to the European market it entails would only make their working conditions harder.

Both they and the government have good reason to worry. In the past, local industry survived because of the high customs duties imposed on foreign imports. If the restrictions on European imports are eased, the local industrial sector which is already struggling to compete may very well collapse. At present, the government is already under pressure to create job opportunities for some 400,000 people entering the job market every year. If the local industrial sector folded, tens of thousands of workers would become unemployed, adding to the country’s economic woes and potentially transforming what was once an economic problem into one of political and social security.

Such disastrous ramifications would not be adequately compensated for in the terms of the current EU-Syria Association Agreement. In fact, Syria gains less from the EU in the agreement than most of its neighbours. The amount of direct financial aid and other technical assistance Syria is set to receive from the EU is far less than that of Jordan, for example.

Furthermore, Syria believes it is being treated unfairly when it comes to certain political commitments the EU has attached to the agreement. Although not binding, these commitments centre on sensitive domestic issues such as political pluralism, media freedom and human rights. Such stringent conditions were not imposed on other countries in the region which have signed association agreements. This is why Syria believes its special treatment is unjustified.

The Netherlands’ double-dealing on human rights has not helped matters. The Dutch government has vetoed the Association Agreement on more than one occasion in recent months, demanding that Damascus improve its human rights record before it is signed. Yet at the UN Human Rights Council in October, Amsterdam voted against the Goldstone Report which condemned Israel’s violation of human rights in Palestine during the January 2009 war on Gaza. Syria views these positions as entirely hypocritical.

Syria has delivered the message to the EU that it will no longer dance to its tune without questioning the record. Indeed, the stakes are too high. Despite the recent set-backs, many people still believe the deal will eventually be signed. In order to ensure this, both sides must confront issues of tension with care. They must work quietly to eliminate any misunderstandings concerning both the form and substance of the agreement.

Marwan Kabalan is a professor at the faculty of political science at the University of Damascus.